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Abstract
We exploit the exogenous characteristic of random freshmen course
assignment in a large Chilean university to identify the causal effect
of teachers and their qualitative characteristics over students’ ma-
jor choice. Using administrative records, we establish what makes
students from the “Commercial Engineering” career chose between
an “Economics” major or a “Business” major. We find that first-
economic-course teachers may account for 15-22% of the probability
of choosing Economics as a major. We also identify which charac-
teristics of these teachers make students more prone to choosing this
particular major. These results are robust to the inclusion of differ-
ent covariates and specifications. Placebo-type falsification tests are
performed, confirming our findings.
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1 Introduction
1.1 About Major Choice
In recent years, several studies have focused on the subject of college major
choice. Indeed, major choice is a well studied subject in many dimensions
because of its relevance in the configuration of our society’s tertiary-educated
citizens. This issue has been in the spotlight over the past decades, as it is
a common phenomena around the world to see, for instance, low female en-
rollment rates in Engineering and Economics majors (Bettinger and Long,
2005), higher enrollment rates in high-return majors for upper-class students
(Macmillan, Tyler, and Vignoles, 2015), among other stylized facts.
The latter examples depict some well-addressed relations between college
major choice and student characteristics. Nevertheless, other important de-
terminants of college major choice lie on the other side of the classroom:
teacher characteristics.
There are a lot of insights from other social sciences such as psychol-
ogy or sociology that confirm the importance of teachers on students’ major
choice decisions (Chambliss and Takacs, 2014). That is, an important future-
determining choice that one might consider as completely endogenous may
still be highly conditioned by external factors such as role-model shocks in-
duced by instructors (Canes and Rosen, 1995; Rask and Bailey, 2002; Zafar,
2013) or informational shocks that affect the future prospect of a major for
each student (Wiswall and Zafar, 2015; Hastings, Neilson, and Zimmerman,
2015).
Notwithstanding, there is an important challenge for economists to quan-
tify these external effects, as usually students choose their teachers accord-
ing to unobserved characteristics and therefore endogenously determine these
“external” shocks that affect their major choice. To address this issue, we
exploit the exogenous characteristic of random freshmen course assignment
in a large Chilean university to identify the causal effect of teachers and their
qualitative characteristics over students’ major choice.
In order to fully understand our methodology, some briefing on the un-
derlying institutional setting is provided in the next subsection.
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1.2 Institutional Setting
The Chilean higher education system possesses some particular features that
converts it into an interesting case to study college major choices. First of
all, the main mechanism to access tertiary education is through a nationally
standardized set of tests called Prueba de Seleccio´n Universitaria (PSU).
Once students obtain their test scores, they may choose among universities
subscribed to this general system1 by ranking their programs in a nationally-
centralized admission system. After this, each university fills each program’s
capacity with the higher-scoring students that opted for them. Students get
enrolled only in the topmost program in which they got accepted. For a
thorougher description of the Chilean higher education admission system,
see Bordon and Fu (2015).
The important part for this study is what comes next. In the School
of Economics and Business of one of the largest universities, when students
get enrolled as freshmen, they get their initial courses assigned randomly,
i.e. they can’t choose their teachers until they start their second semester.
This ensures that first-semester teachers are completely exogenous for these
freshmen, and so are the eventual shocks they might receive from them.
This School offers three programs: i) Commercial Engineering, ii) Engi-
neering in Information and Management Control and iii) Accounting-Auditing.
An important fact is that the former program mandates students in their
second year to choose between two radically opposite majors: Economics or
Business. It’s because of this characteristic that we’ll pose our attention on
students enrolled in the Commercial Engineering program.
As a last part of this short institutional setting briefing, we’ll also exploit
a mandatory survey that students must fill each semester. In this survey
there is a module oriented to teacher characteristics, in which students rate
each professor they had in that corresponding semester. For more details on
the questionnaire, see Table 4 in Appendix A.
The rest of the document is structured as follows: section 2 shortly reviews
some of the existing literature, section 3 presents a simple model which,
combined with the data presented in section 4, allows different specifications
from section 5 to obtain the results from section section 6. Finally, section 7
provides a simple robustness check and section 8 concludes.
1There are some universities that don’t qualify into this system.
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2 Literature Review
There is a broad (and somewhat controvertial) literature in educational eco-
nomics concerning college major choices. For instance, Montmarquette, Can-
nings, and Mahseredjian (2002) use mixed multinomial logit and probit mod-
els to identify the effect of expected earnings on the probability that a student
will choose a specific major among four choices of concentrations, while Ar-
cidiacono (2004) and Arcidiacono, Hotz, and Kang (2012) develop structural
models to explain college major choices based on the expected future stream
of income that each one yields.
On the reduced-form side, Sacerdote (2001) and Sohn (2016) exploit dif-
ferent natural experiments to identify their effects on educational outcomes,
among them, college major choice. Wiswall and Zafar (2015) explicitly focus
on college major choice by implementing a randomized controlled trial with
an informational treatment.
There’s also a lot of interest in determining till what extent teachers influ-
ence students in different dimensions. Influence can be though many mech-
anisms, like gender-matching (Paredes, 2014), race-matching (Dee, 2004) or
simply because of the teacher’s quality (Carrell and West, 2010).
Notwithstanding, research focusing on the causal effects of teachers (and
their characteristics) on college major choices is scarce 2. This is mainly3
due to the fact that usually teachers are endogenously chosen at college and
therefore this yields the typical absence of an appropriate counterfactual to
identify the effect (Holland, 1986).
Thus, there are a few randomized controlled trials, but no one has ex-
plored deeply into individual characteristics of teachers and how they affect
college major choices. A contribution of this document is the use of a rich and
extensive data set that, through a random assignment, allows for a causal
identification (Rubin, 1974) of the effect of particular teacher characteristics
on college major choices.
2For a superb review of the existing literature, see Grove and Wu (2011).
3Other important reason may be the lack of direct policy implications. We’ll get back
to this shortly.
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3 The Model
In spite of basing our results on a random assignment, an underlying the-
oretical model is explicitly presented in order to account for the eventual
assumptions being made when computing treatment effects (Keane, 2010).
Consider that student i may choose between majoring in Business or in
Economics. Denote the observed outcome Yi as 1 if she chooses Economics
and 0 if not. Suppose that there is a tacit net utility of choosing Economics
over Business for student i and denote it as Ui. Thus, we have that
Yi =
{
1 iff Ui > 0
0 iff Ui ≤ 0 , (1)
i.e. student i is fully rational and will choose a major if and only if it yields
a higher net utility than the other.
Now we impose some structure on Ui, letting it be
Ui = β0 +
∑
j∈J
βjTij + XB + εi, (2)
where Tij is 1 if student i was assigned to teacher j in set J and 0 if not, X is
a set of observed characteristics and εi is an unobserved error component. In
this case, βj may be interpreted as the effect of a non-specific shock received
by a student from teacher j, just as we commented before.
Suppose now that εi ∼ N(0, σ2t ), where t indexes years/cohorts. Then,
substituting (2) in (1) we get
Yi =
{
1 iff β0 +
∑
j∈J βjTij + XB + εi > 0
0 iff β0 +
∑
j∈J βjTij + XB + εi ≤ 0
.
But β0+
∑
j∈J βjTij+XB+εi > 0 ⇐⇒ εi > −
(
β0 +
∑
j∈J βjTij + XB
)
and the odds of this event are equal to
P
(
Yi = 1| {Tij}j∈J ,X
)
= Φ
[(
β0 +
∑
j∈J
βjTij + XB
)
/σt
]
,
where Φ is a cumulative standardized Gaussian distribution.
Therefore, we finally obtain a reduced-form probit model described by
Yi = β0 +
∑
j∈J
βjTij + XB + εi.
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4 Data
We use administrative data from a large Chilean university, particularly from
its School of Economics and Business. We possess information from ten
cohorts spanning from 2005 to 2014 on a biannual basis (whole available
database).
The data is restricted only to freshmen enrolled in Commercial Engineer-
ing on their first semester whose teachers were randomly assigned. Their
major choice is retrieved from the same administrative records.
For identification purposes, we’ll be interested in the Introduction to Eco-
nomics (ECON101) course. In this way, Tij will be 1 if student i was assigned
to teacher j in the ECON101 course, so J is restricted to the set of (thirteen)
teachers that dictate ECON101 in the sample.
Additionally, we only consider teachers that have been at least 2 years
with the course. This ensures a minimum amount of student observations
per teacher and eliminates potential noise generated by “first-and-last-time”
teachers (with no experience, where the course was not of their preference,
etc.). Figure 1 shows the average probability of majoring in economics over
all the considered ECON101 professors.
Finally, we count with several control variables such as the grade (scaled
continuously from 1 to 7) of each student on the ECON101 course, the en-
trance score constructed as a weighted average their PSU scores, their prefer-
ence ranking for the program, their school GPA, the week days on which the
ECON101 course is dictated (1 if lectures are held Monday and Thursday
and 2 if they’re held Tuesday and Friday), a failure status dummy and a
“Block” variable that indicates the time schedule in which lectures are held4.
Summary statistics for all of these variables are presented in Table 1.
Note how about 40% of the students choose Economics as their major5, so
we have enough variation in majors to identify effects. It’s also important
to note that this School has relatively high entrance scores, as the coun-
try’s mean score in each test is standardized to 500 points with a standard
4It’s equal to 1 if lectures are from 8:00 am to 9:30 am, 2 if they are from 9:40 am to
11:10 am, 3 from 11:20 am to 12:50 pm, 4 from 1:30 pm to 3:00 pm, 5 from 3:10 pm to
4:40 pm and 6 from 4:50 pm to 6:20 pm.
5We have only 1561 observations because some students of the last cohorts haven’t
chosen their major yet, mainly because they’ve failed courses and delayed their career.
6
deviation of 110 points, i.e. the School’s mean is two standard deviations
over the national average. School GPA’s mean is over 90% of the full score
and failure rates are relatively low for the ECON101 course (about 12%).
Bivariate histograms are shown for the former two variables in Figure 2 for
students majoring in Economics and in Figure 3 for Administration majors
while individual densities are shown in Figure 4 and Figure 5 for each major.
A potential threat is given because the data set is very unbalanced, as
some teachers have more than 13% of observations while others barely pass
3%. Years are more balanced, but we still have problems with year 2012
(administrative issues that will be solved soon in the next edition of this
document...). Other caveat is the fact that βj might not be identifying the
effect of teacher j, but might include confounding effects such as teacher j’s
TAs or the classroom assigned. In this sense, the effect may be interpreted
as an all-inclusive effect, not only as the single impact of the teacher.
Having all of this clear, we may explain our main identification strategy.
Figure 1: Percentage of Students Majoring in Economics by Professor
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Econ. Major 1561 .4144779 (.4927895) 0 1
ECON101 Grade 1829 4.793166 (.9228158) 1.2 7
Entrance Score 1827 723.9126 (23.40134) 679.1 830.2
Preference 1340 1.485821 (.6619559) 1 4
School GPA 1827 6.414926 (.2583345) 5.1 7
Week Days 1829 1.300164 (.4584545) 1 2
Failed ECON101 1829 .1246583 (.3304214) 0 1
Prof. 2 1829 .0437397 (.2045714) 0 1
Prof. 3 1829 .0732641 (.2606407) 0 1
Prof. 4 1829 .1388737 (.3459093) 0 1
Prof. 5 1829 .1098961 (.3128458) 0 1
Prof. 6 1829 .0464735 (.2105658) 0 1
Prof. 7 1829 .1394204 (.3464795) 0 1
Prof. 8 1829 .0656096 (.2476662) 0 1
Prof. 9 1829 .0415528 (.1996194) 0 1
Prof. 10 1829 .1306725 (.337134) 0 1
Prof. 11 1829 .1170038 (.3215128) 0 1
Prof. 12 1829 .0322581 (.176733) 0 1
Prof. 13 1829 .0311646 (.1738098) 0 1
Block. 2 1829 .2121378 (.4089337) 0 1
Block. 3 1829 .1618371 (.368402) 0 1
Block. 4 1829 .0896665 (.2857815) 0 1
Block. 5 1829 .0426463 (.2021135) 0 1
Block. 6 1829 .049754 (.2174957) 0 1
Year 2006 1829 .0978677 (.2972169) 0 1
Year 2007 1829 .0967742 (.2957309) 0 1
Year 2008 1829 .1109896 (.3142052) 0 1
Year 2009 1829 .0995079 (.2994246) 0 1
Year 2010 1829 .1328595 (.3395156) 0 1
Year 2011 1829 .0978677 (.2972169) 0 1
Year 2012 1829 .0448332 (.2069943) 0 1
Year 2013 1829 .1109896 (.3142052) 0 1
Year 2014 1829 .1388737 (.3459093) 0 1
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Figure 2: ECON101 Grade and Entrance Score for Economics Majors
5 Identification Strategy
Course assignment is random, conditional on program. As our sample con-
sists uniquely of students of the Commercial Engineering career, assignment
is completely random for them.
We estimate the following pooled6 Probit model:
Yi = β0 +
∑
j∈J
βjTij + XB + εi, (3)
where Yij is 1 if student i chooses economics as her major and 0 otherwise;
Tij is 1 if she is assigned to professor j in set J and 0 otherwise; X is a set of
student and course covariates and εi is a well-behaved unobserved component.
In this case, the βj coefficients in (3) will account for the mean effect of
teacher j (and all the other eventual confounding effects we discussed before)
on the odds of choosing Economics as a major.
6Exploiting the panel characteristic of out data set won’t allow us to have enough power
due to the reduced amount of observations per cohort that we possess.
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Figure 3: ECON101 Grade and Entrance Score for Administration Majors
Additional to this main specification, a second (and surely more interest-
ing) set of estimations are held. The idea is to recover the characteristics of
teachers that make students more prone to choosing an Economics major.
In order to do this, we make use of administrative data containing all the
student responses to the Teacher Evaluation Survey (TES) that proxy twelve
different characteristics of different professors. Thus, one may estimate the
effect of each of these characteristics with the reduced-form probit model
described by
Yi = β0 +
∑
j∈J
Tij ·
(∑
k∈K
βkQijk
)
+ XB + εi, (4)
where Qijk denotes the score (ranging from 1 to 7) for teacher j in charac-
teristic k ∈ K and where teacher-specific fixed components are included.
To account for the endogeneity of Qijk, it is replaced by Qtjk, i.e. the
average score of characteristic k for professor j in cohort t (not provided by
student i, but by her classmates). Therefore, this aggregate measure of each
characteristic is an exogenous covariate that may impact student i’s major.
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Figure 4: ECON101 Grades of Economics and Administration Majors
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–Coming soon: Relative effect of characteristics... A variation of model
(4) will be estimated using Economics-Business teacher pairs as Tj and the
score difference of each characteristic as Qtjk to account for relative, not abso-
lute, effects of them. The hypothesis tested behind this is that major choice
may not necessarily be highly conditioned because of a teacher’s particular
characteristic, but because of the comparison of it against another teacher.
This may shed some light on how important are relative prospects (opposed
to absolute prospects) when students choose majors. Additionally, model (3)
will also be estimated only with Business teachers.–
6 Results
The results for the estimation of (3) with different controls are presented in
Table 2. As one can easily see, significant coefficients are relatively stable
under different specifications. Thus, there are four teachers that actually
influence relevantly in students’ major choice, evidencing that this decision
may actually be exogenously conditioned. Moreover, there are some teachers
that can even increment in over 20% the probability of choosing an Eco-
nomics major, i.e. they can neutralize the effect of failing ECON101!
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Table 2: Probit Estimates (Marginal Effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Econ. Major Econ. Major Econ. Major Econ. Major
Prof. 2 (d) 0.0912 0.0252 0.0188 0.0191
(0.0897) (0.0815) (0.0751) (0.0749)
Prof. 3 (d) 0.0742 0.0634 0.0581 0.0583
(0.120) (0.154) (0.149) (0.148)
Prof. 4 (d) 0.0328 0.0565 0.0836 0.0841
(0.0860) (0.105) (0.0999) (0.1000)
Prof. 5 (d) 0.0186 0.0351 0.0619 0.0623
(0.0813) (0.101) (0.0959) (0.0955)
Prof. 6 (d) 0.152 0.129 0.132 0.132
(0.136) (0.148) (0.140) (0.140)
Prof. 7 (d) 0.0629 0.0519 0.0853 0.0856
(0.0925) (0.101) (0.0931) (0.0926)
Prof. 8 (d) 0.136 0.123 0.124 0.123
(0.0874) (0.112) (0.107) (0.105)
Prof. 9 (d) 0.220∗∗ 0.214∗∗ 0.214∗∗ 0.215∗∗
(0.0994) (0.107) (0.101) (0.101)
Prof. 10 (d) 0.160∗ 0.153∗ 0.154∗ 0.154∗
(0.0887) (0.0931) (0.0879) (0.0884)
Prof. 11 (d) 0.142∗∗ 0.161∗ 0.168∗∗ 0.168∗∗
(0.0716) (0.0875) (0.0819) (0.0824)
Prof. 12 (d) 0.105 0.132 0.120 0.120
(0.0863) (0.113) (0.109) (0.108)
Prof. 13 (d) 0.223∗ 0.228∗ 0.215 0.215
(0.123) (0.126) (0.131) (0.131)
Failed ECON101 -0.236∗∗∗ -0.236∗∗∗
(0.0433) (0.0439)
School GPA 0.00258
(0.0374)
Block Controls NO YES YES YES
Observations 1561 1561 1561 1559
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 3: Effect of Teacher Characteristics on Major
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Econ. Major Econ. Major Econ. Major Econ. Major
Shows Confidence -0.0366 -0.0189 -0.00832 -0.00224
(0.128) (0.127) (0.125) (0.127)
Prepares Classes 0.0202 0.00787 0.0353 0.0228
(0.0736) (0.0829) (0.0845) (0.0876)
Exposes Clearly -0.0327 -0.0355 -0.0468 -0.0479
(0.140) (0.158) (0.160) (0.160)
Solves Doubts -0.0963 -0.0802 -0.0926 -0.0925
(0.185) (0.195) (0.194) (0.194)
Promotes Discussion -0.122 -0.110 -0.0867 -0.0890
(0.112) (0.107) (0.106) (0.107)
Allows Sharing Ideas 0.305∗∗ 0.264∗ 0.276∗∗ 0.276∗∗
(0.146) (0.136) (0.133) (0.136)
Stimulates Interest 0.199∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗ 0.210∗∗ 0.211∗∗
(0.0769) (0.0972) (0.0966) (0.0966)
Evaluates Fairly 0.142∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗ 0.125∗∗ 0.132∗∗
(0.0551) (0.0704) (0.0593) (0.0593)
Shows-up Punctually -0.0434 -0.0312 -0.0315 -0.0256
(0.0629) (0.0685) (0.0695) (0.0694)
Meets Deadlines 0.00697 -0.00686 -0.0103 -0.0123
(0.0333) (0.0446) (0.0483) (0.0476)
Treats Respectfully -0.280∗∗∗ -0.293∗∗∗ -0.307∗∗∗ -0.308∗∗∗
(0.104) (0.113) (0.107) (0.105)
Is Available -0.00122 0.00390 -0.00170 -0.00310
(0.0635) (0.0711) (0.0713) (0.0717)
Failed ECON101 (d) -0.235∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗∗
(0.0373) (0.0376)
School GPA -0.00538
(0.0430)
Block Controls NO YES YES YES
Observations 1540 1540 1540 1539
Marginal effects; Standard errors in parentheses
(d) for discrete change of dummy variable from 0 to 1
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 5: Entrance Scores of Economics and Administration Majors
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When digging into what characteristics make students more prone to
choosing the Economics major, there are four winners. The first and most
important characteristic is related to the extent up till which teachers allow
questions and expressing ideas (Characteristic 6 from Appendix A). Indeed
one might expect economists as “social scientists” to be more oriented to-
wards expressing their opinion about any social matter.
A second characteristic is precisely how stimulating is the teacher when
advancing through the syllabus. This surely proxies how much interest for
economics will be rooted in each student. A third, but less relevant character-
istic indicates the perception of fairness in evaluations. I’d say that students
that feel they were evaluated unfairly are mostly the ones with worst grades.
Thus, this may seriously correlate with ECON101 grades and therefore ma-
jor choice.
As a final characteristic we have how respectful is a teacher with her
students. In this case, the effect is negative, i.e. if teachers are respectful,
students are less prone to choosing Economics. One might think that re-
spectfulness and closeness with students may be negatively correlated, and
thus, “disrespectful” ECON101 teachers may actually just be more friendly
to students, making them have a better prospect of Economics as a major.
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Figure 6: Prob. of Majoring in Economics by ECON101 Situation
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7 Robustness Check
Over the 2005-2012 period, the other two careers at this School, the “Engi-
neering in Information and Management Control” program and “Accounting-
Auditing” program where considered as a single one for freshmen. Once
they’d finished the common core of both programs, they could choose on
which one to major. Nevertheless, this common core also includes both, the
Introduction to Economics course and the Management and Business course
and a random assignment is performed, just as in the Commercial Engineer-
ing case.
Notwithstanding, this major choice shouldn’t have much relation with,
say, the Introduction to Economics course, as the majors they choose have
practically no direct relation with the subject. Therefore, as a robustness
check, the original specifications are tested over a sample containing only
students that are not enrolled in the Commercial Engineering program. The
sample is restricted to the cohorts that entered college before 2013, as in
this year there was a major curricular reform that modified the enrollment
system, separating Engineering in Information and Management Control and
Accounting-Auditing as two different programs.
15
–The results of this falsification test will be presented in the next edition of
this document... Future versions of this paper will also consider other (much
more unexplored) effects: the impact of teachers and their characteristics on
(first job) labor market outcomes.–
8 Concluding Remarks
Contrary to what one may think, important decisions such as choosing a
college major are not completely endogenously taken. Indeed, there is a sig-
nificant and economically important effect of freshmen teachers over college
major choice. The conditioning estimated effect of teachers on the chances
their students opt for the Economics major spans from about 15% to almost
22%. This is robust to different specifications.
There are also certain characteristics that exogenously bend students to-
wards choosing Economics as a major. These make intuitive sense and may
be also very relevant when making this decision.
As in most “experimental designs” such as this one, there is a clear lack
of external validity. Indeed, there is no way to ensure such results may be
replicated in other context, not even with the same program and in the same
country7. Thus, results must be handled with care and policy implications
must not blindly follow them, but use them as a case study with high internal
validity.
Finally, as a future research agenda we’d like to propose other dimen-
sions in which teachers may causally impact students and their future career
development. These kind of random assignments are a great opportunity to
explore and answer important questions on how higher-education students
are formed and how does this formation impact the configuration of our
future tertiary-educated society.
7As we commented earlier, this is a very selective university with a very particular
context.
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A Questionnaire of TES
Table 4: Teacher Evaluation Survey
Q Characteristic (in Spanish)
01. Demuestra seguridad y dominio sobre las materias
02. Prepara las clases
03. Es claro para exponer las materias
04. Resuelve dudas y problemas de los alumnos
05. Incentiva la discusio´n y participacio´n
06. Permite hacer preguntas y expresar ideas
07. Estimula el intere´s por las materias
08. Hace evaluaciones justas y razonables
09. Asiste puntualmente a clases
10. Cumple plazos y normas establecidas
11. Trata a sus alumnos con respeto
12. Esta´ disponible para sus alumnos
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